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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR . 
~tmt <q~ of tltt ~tb iltatt• 
jla$!{inghm. ~. <!}. 2.0p'l-~ 
June 19, 1972 
Re: No. 71-5625 Kois v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
One of the unfinished items on my agenda is voting in the 
above case. 
Unless a decision is made to hold it, you may note me 
as joining you. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. ,Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
~o: The Chtef Justlco 
·\· Mr. Justice Doug1as 
Mr. Justice Bre;mr n 
\ Mr. Jm1tico St,e;:;~:c·j; 
Mr. Juc·ticP Wl Fe 
1st DRAFT Ur. Ju~t:1 c~ 1 -~: :<,n 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES!Y.~~=~~~: ~~ 'l~l~tPl 
JOHN R KOIS v. STATE OF WISCONSI~rom: Rehnquist, .T . 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 'I'HE SUM~:;s(l;J lated: .3 pI /r'--
COURT OF WISCONSIN 
Recirculated: 
No. 71-5625. Derided April-, 1972 
PER CuRIAM. 
Petitioner was co1wictecl in the state trial court of vio-
lating a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the dissemination 
of "lewd, obscene or indecent written matter, picture, 
sound recording, or film." He vms sentenced to consecu-
tive one-year terms in the Green Bay Reformatory and 
fined $1 ,000 on each of two counts. The Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin upheld his conviction against his contention 
that he had been deprived of freedom of the press in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Petitioner was the publisher of an underground news-
paper called "Kaleidoscope." In an issue published in 
May, 1968, that newspaper carried a story entitled "The 
One Hundred Thousand Dollar Photos" on an interior 
page. The story itself was an account of the arrest of 
one of Kaleidoscope's photographers on a charge of pos-
session of obscene material. Two relatively small pic-
tures, showing a nude man and nude woman embracing 
in a sitting position, accompanied the article and were 
described in the article as "similar" to those seized from 
the photographer. The article said that the photog-
rapher, while waiting in the district attorney's office, had 
heard that bail might be set at $100,000. The article 
went on to say that bail had in fact been set originally 
at $100, then raised to $250, and that later the photog-
rapher had been released on his own recognizance. The 
article purported to detail police tactics which were de-
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Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1957), held that 
obscenity was not protected under the First or Four-
teenth Amendments. Obscenity was there defined as 
material which "to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme 
of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient 
interest." 354 U. S., at 489. In enunciating this test, 
the Court in Roth quoted from Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 u. s. 88, 101-102: 
"The freedom of speech and of the press guaran-
teed by the Constitution embraces at the least the 
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters 
of public concern without previous restraint or fear 
of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the 
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom 
from oppressive administration developed a broad-
ened conception of these liberties as adequate to 
supply the public need for information and educa-
tion with respect to the significant issues of the 
times .... " 
We do not think it ran fairly be said. either consider-
ing the article as it appears or the record before the state 
court, that the article \Yas a mere vehicle for the publi-
cation of the picture. .A quotation from Voltaire in the 
flyleaf of a book ''"ill not constitutionally redeem an 
otherwise ohsc<.'ne publication, but if these pictures were 
indeed similar to the one scizccl-ancl "·e do not under-
stand the State to contend differently-they arc relevant 
to the theme of the article. 'Yc find it unnecssary to 
consider whether the State could constitutionally pro-
hibit the dissemination of the pictures by themselves, 
because in the context in \Yhich they appeared in the 
newspaper they \YCre rationally related to an article which 
itself was clearly cntitkcl to the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Thornhill v. Alabama, supra. The 
conviction on count one must therefore be reversed. 
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In its August 1968 issue. Kaleidoscope published a 
two-page spread consisting of 11 poems, one of which 
was entitled "Sex Poem." The second count of peti-
tioner's conviction was for the dissemination of the 
newspaper containing this poem. The poem is an undis-
guiscdly frank , play-by-play account of the author's 
reco11cction of sexual intercourse. But as the Rolh 
Court emphasized, "sex and obscenity are not synony-
mous. . . . The portrayal of sex, e. g., in art, literature 
and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny 
matcral the constitutional protection of freedom of speech 
and press." 354 U. S., at 487. A reviewing court must, 
of necessity, look at the context of the material, as well 
as .its content. 
In this case, considering the poem's content and its 
placement amid a selection of poems in the interior of 
a newspaper, ''"e believe that it bears some of the ear-
marks of an attempt at serious art. While such ear-
marks are not inevitably a guarantee against a finding 
of obscenity. and while in this case many would conclude 
that the author's reach exceeded his grasp, this element 
must be considered in assessing whether or not the 
"dominant" theme of the material is to prurient interest. 
While "contemparary community standards," Roth v. 
United States, 354 U. S., at 489, must leave room for 
some latitude of judgment on the part of state courts, 
and while there is an undeniably subjective clement in 
the test as a whole, the "dominance" of the theme is a 
question of constitutional fact. Giving due weight and 
respect to the conclusions of the trial court and to the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we do not believe that it 
can be said that the dominant theme of this poem ap-
peals to prurient interest. The judgment on the second 
count, therefore, must also be reversed. 
Reversed. 
To: 'l'ho Ch' ef .T,·,··L:i ce 
~~~r . Ju.c l: ~~ ce ~ _:·\_ .. ur.~.an 
Lr . Jvs~!ca StG.~rt 
I·~ J t:Gb ne Vr.l!l.te 
ll.ry ,Tu~: "~cc L .:>.'~1l1al l 
I . ;; ... t~, t.: 0 1 i_ ~.c 1_·. ·un -----
1st DRAFT Mr . J ... s ~·co l ,c .• 1 ~ 
Mr . J·u..., Gic u hc:..hn . .l.List 
SUPRE~lJ~ COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
From : Do;:..;- lJ.s , J. 
PAUL CHAPMAN v. STATE OF CALJ(fiQgJU~ed : 
ON PETITION FOR WRI'l' OF CEH'l'IORARI TO Tey~ .COURTl Ot d 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE D':fl:H<ft18¥ a e : 
N"o. 71-Gl.~. Derided A11ril -, 1971 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting. 
Petitioner operates a bookstore in Fremont, California. 
On two occasions, a police officer visited the store and 
purchased four magazines and one paperback novel. 
While in the store the second time, the officer also 
"looked at parts" of 12 additional magazines and 14 
other paperback books which were on petitioner's shelves. 
Based upon a reading of the four magazines, portions 
of the book, and the officer's conclusory affidavit, a 
magistrate issued an ex parte search warrant authorizing 
the seizure of the publications the officer had earlier pur-
chased or perused. The warrant was executed and 78 
copies of 35 different titles were seized. Among the 
items seized were 19 copies of nine magazines not speci-
fied in the warra.nt and apparently not previously evalu-
ated by a magistrate. 
Petitioner was charged with the sale or distribution 
of obscene matter in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 311.2. 
Petitioner made a motion under §§ 1538.5, 1539, 1540 of 
the Cal. Penal Code to suppress the evidence and to 
return the property seized. The municipal court ordered 
the return of the books which had not been specified in 
the \Yarrant and of one book which it found not to be 
obscene.1 It denied petitioner's motion in all other re-
1 It does not appear that the rCS]10ndent appealed from that por-
tion of the municipal court's order suppressing the books which 
had not bern specified in the warrant or which had been found not 
to be obscene. The Court of Appeal nonetheless upheld the admis-
'ibility of those books which had not been specified in the warrant 
and vacated the municipal court's order to the contrary. 
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spects. On appeal, the Appellate Department of the 
Superior Court ordered the suppression of those items 
which had been seized without a prior adversary hearing 
on their obscenity vel non but affirmed the municipal 
court with regard to the materials which had been 
purchased. The State then appealed and the Court of 
Appeal reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate 
Department and vacated in part the judgment of the 
municipal court, thereby allowing the admission into 
evidence of all the items except the one which had been 
determined not to be obscene. 17 Cal. App. 3d 865, 95 
Cal. Rptr. 242. The Supreme Court of California denied 
a hearing and petitioner now "eeks a writ of certiorari. 
Our jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts is 
limited to "[f j inal judgments or decrees rendered by the 
highest court of a State in which a decision could be 
had .... " 28 U. S. C. ~ 1257. The finality require-
ment, which has been with us since the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, ~ 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85, is "[d]esigned to avoid the 
evils of piecemeal review," Republic Natural Gas Co. v. 
Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62, 67, and is founded upon "con-
siderations generally applicable to good judicial admin-
istration." Radio Station WOfV, In c. v. Johnson , 326 
U. S. 120. 124. Our decisions make clear, however, that 
"this provision of the statute [has long been given a] 
practical rather than a technical construction." Cohen 
v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546. Thus, 
where denial of review would effectively foreclose our 
later consideration of a federal claim, Cal·ifornia v. 
Stewart, 383 U. S. 903, 386 U. S. 436, 498 n. 71; Hill v. 
Chicago & Evanston R. Co., 140 U.S. 52, 54; ''"here post-
ponement of review \Yould seriously erode a federal 
policy, Local No. 438 Y. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 550; 
Rosenblatt Y. American Cyanamid Co ., 86 S. Ct. 1, 3; 
or "·here determination of preliminary questions might 
avoid subsequent litigation, Mercantile iVational Bank 
v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 558, we have determin0d 
that the requirement of finality had been satisfied. 
·. 
CliAPl\IA~ v. CALIFORNIA 
Similarly, where the subsequent proceedings in state 
court would deny the federal right for the vindication 
of which review was sought, we have concluded that the 
case was final. Sec, e. g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U. S. 213 (speedy trial); Harris v. Washington, 404 
U. S. 55 (double jeopardy); Colombo v. New York, 405 
U. S. - (double jeopardy). And, as MR. JusTICE 
WHITJD indicated for the Court in Mercantile Nalional 
Bank v. Langdeau, supra, at 558, ''"e have found the 
policies underlying § 1257 satisfied where the matter to 
be revic11·ed was entirely "separate and independent" 
from those to be raised in the subsequent state 
proceedings.~ 
In Mills Y. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, a case strikingly 
similar to the prescllt one, we determined that the finality 
requirement had been met. There, the trial court had 
Pustained a demurrer to the complaint, but the Supreme 
Court of Alabama reversed and remanded for trial. 
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for eight members of the 
Court, concluded that we had jurisdiction under § 1257: 
"The State has moved to dismiss the appeal on 
the ground that the Alabama Supreme Court's 
judgment is not a 'final judgment' and therefore not 
appealable under § 1257. The State argues that 
since the Alabama Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with its opinion (which would include 
a trial), the Supreme Court's judgment cannot be 
considered 'final.' This argument has a surface 
2 "Thi~ is a sepnrate nnd indepC'miC'nt maitC'r, antrrior to the 
merih nncl not rnmrHhC'd in the factual and lrgnl i~'urs eomprising 
the plaintiff'~ cau~r of action. :!\Iorconr, 1\'C' l)('liC'\'C' that it SC'rYes 
the polic~· UIJdrrl~·ing thC' rr(]uirrn1C'nt of fin:dity in 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257 to detrrmine now in which ~<tate court apprllnnt~ m:1y lw 
tried rathC'r thnn to ~ubjrct them, nllCI nppelleC', to long and com-
p!C'x litigation which mn~· all be for nnught if rolwiciC'rntion of the 
preliminnry quC'~t ion of nnue is po ·tponecl until the ronrlusion or 
the prorC'C'cling~." 371 U. S. , nt 558. 
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plausibility, since it is true the judgment of the 
State Supreme Court did not literally end the case. 
It did, however, render a judgment binding upon 
the trial court that it must convict Mills under this 
state statute if he wrote and published the edi-
torial. Mills concedes that he did, and he there-
fore has no defense in the Alabama trial court. 
Thus if the case goes back to the trial court, the 
trial, so far as this record shows, would be no more 
than a few formal gestures leading inexorably to-
wards a conviction, and then another appeal to the 
Alabama Supreme Court for it formally to repeat 
its rejection of Mills' constitutional contentions 
whereupon the case could then once more wind its 
weary way back to us as a judgment unquestion-
ably final and appealable. Such a roundabout proc-
ess 'vould not only be an inexcusr.ble delay of the 
benefits Congress intended to grant by providing for 
appeal to this Court, but it would also result in 
a completely unnecessary waste of time and energy 
in judicial systems already troubled by delays due 
to congested dockets. The language of § 1257 as 
we construed it in Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
Co., 345 U. S. 379, 381-383, does not require a 
result leading to such consequences. See also Con-
struction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 548-551; 
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69, 72-
74. Following those cases we hold that we have 
jurisdiction." 384 U. S., at 217-218. (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
In a concurring opinion joined by MR. JusTICE BREN-
NAN, I said: 
"We deal here with the rights of free speech and 
press in a basic form: the right to express views on 
matters before the electorate. In light of appel-
lant's concession that he has no other defense to 
offer should the case go to trial, and considering 
I .. 
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the importance of the First Amendment rights at 
stake in this litigation, it would require regard for 
some remote, theoretical interests of federalism to 
conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction because 
of the unlikely possibility that a jury might dis-
regard a trial judge's instructions and acquit. 
"Indeed, even had appellant been unwilling to 
concede that he has no defense-apart from the 
constitutional question-to the charges against him, 
we would be warranted in reviewing this case. That 
result follows a fortiori from our holdings that 
where First Amendment rights are jeopardized by 
a state prosecution which, by its very nature, 
threatens to deter others from exercising their First 
Amendment rights, a federal court will take the 
extraordinary step of enjoining the state prosecu-
tion." 384 U. S., at 221. (Citations omitted.) 
The issues petitioner tenders are important ones. 
They go to the constitutionality of mass seizures of 
materials presumptively protected by the First Amend-
ment, Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205; Mar-
cus v. Search Warrants, 367 U. S. 717; the need for a 
prior adversary hearing before protected materials are 
condemned as obscene, Lee Art Theatres, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 392 U. S. 636; Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra; 
the procedural burdens which must be overcome to 
secure the return of protected materials, United States v. 
Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363; cf. Freedman 
v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51; The sufficiency of the officer's 
affidavit, the seizure of materials not specified in the 
warrant, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 569 (STEW-
ART, J., concurring); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 
192; and, of course, the obscenity vel non of the 
publications. 
No significant question of fact or law remains for 
trial. It seems beyond argument that petitioner pos-
sessed the publications in question "for sale or distribu-
6 CHAPMAN v. CALIFORNIA 
tion." Cal. Penal Code § 311.2. Petitioner's only 
viable defenses appear to be whether the publications 
were constitutionally protected and whether their seizure 
in some way was procedurally defective. These issues 
"·ere passed upon by the courts below and arc now before 
us for decision. 
The purpose of furthering economy in judicial admin-
istration would be plainly be served by deciding these 
questions now rather than by sending petitioner through 
the formalities of a trial and months-if not years-of 
repetitious appellate review before allowing him to pre-
sent to this Court again the very issues that are here 
now.a California has sought to conserve its judicial 
resources by providing pretrial appellate review of sup-
pression hearings. Where the admissibility of evidence 
is the only real issue, this policy generally results either 
in the prompt dismissal of the charges without trial or 
in a plea bargain and guilty plea. The interests in the 
smooth working of our federal system and our accom-
modation of California's interests in pretrial adjudica-
tion of dispositive questions of law dictate that we not 
postpone our consideration of the federal questions now 
presented. 
This is not a case involving only a pretrial motion 
to su11press. Rather, the motion now before us em-
braces all of the evidence the prosecution will intro-
duce at trial and common to all of these items is the 
issue of their obscenity vel non. Mills v. Alabama, 
supra, teaches that where First Amendment rights are 
involved, compliance with procedural formalities before 
allowing their vindication in this Court is not necessary 
unless those procedures are meaningful. 
I would follow Mills and grant the petition for a writ 
of certiorari and put the case down for argument. 
a E,·rn if the California courts refuse to rrronsidrr their earlirr 
ruling~, petitioner will be free to presrnt thr ~ame claims now rai~ed 
in the 11resent petition for a writ of certiorari. R. Stem & E. Gre~~­
man, Supreme Court Practice 102 (4th ad. 1969). 
.... 
To: The C"' ·.:l lGi' Justice 
l.fr . ,h:...,~ico Bl''Hman 
Mr . J:2t:Ge S~ewart 
1£r. ,; J.d L c"' \'!bite 
!lr · Ju...., ~.; ee Marshall' 
2nd DRAFT 
Hr. J:.1~:,~ice B.lackm~~ / 
Ur. Jl.GLJ..co .Pu.lell~ 
Mr. J ka~ice Eohnquist 
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, concurring. 
I concur in the judgment because neither logic, history, 
nor the plain meaning of the English language will sup-
port the obscenity exception this Court has engrafted 
onto the First Amendment. United States v. 12 200-Ft. 
Reels of Filrn, ante, at- (DouGLAS, J., concurring). 
This case, moreover, is further testimony to the mor-
ass in which this Court has placed itself in the area of 
obscenity. Miller v. California, ante, at - (DouGLAS, 
J., dissenting). Men are sent to prison under definitions 
which they cannot understand and on which lower courts 
and members of this Court cannot agree. Here, the 
Court is forced to examine the thematic content of the 
two newspapers for the publication of which petitioner 
was prosecuted in order to hold that they are constitu-
tionally protected. Highly subjective inquiries such as 
this do not lend themselves to a workable or predictable 
rule of law, nor should they be the basis of fines or 
imprisonment. 
In this case, the vague umbrella of obscenity laws was 
used in an attempt to run a radical newspaper out of 
business and to impose a two-year sentence and a $2,000 
fine upon its publisher. If obscenity laws continue in 
this uneven and uncertain enforcement, then the vehicle 
has been found for the suppression of any unpopular 
tract. The guarantee of free expression will thus be 
diluted and in its stead public discourse will only embrace 
that which has the approval of five members of this Court. 
2 KOIS v. WISCONSIN 
The prospect is not imaginary now that the Bill of 
Rights, applicable to the States by reason of the Four-
teenth Amendment is coming to be a "watered down" I 
version, meaning not what it does when applied to the 
Federal Government but only what a majority of this 
Court thinks fit and proper. 
t; 
'· 
